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In this Article, Professor Radhika Rao sketches out the parameters of the
constitutional right of privacy and applies the right to "new" reproductive tech-
nologies, such as artificial insemination, in vitro fertilizatibn, and surrogacy.
The thesis of the Article is that privacy--currently miscast as an individual
right-must be reconceived as a relational right in order to capture its social
* Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of Law. A.B., Harvard
University, 1986; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1990. This Article was conceived during my visit to
the University of Michigan Law School in fall 1996. It developed in the course of conversations
with and comments from Janet Benshoof, Ash Bhagwat, Jo Carrillo, Carl Coleman, Mary
Crossley, Martha Field, Mary Ann Glendon, Marina Hsieh, Yale Kamisar, Evan Lee, Deborah
Malamud, Rick Pildes, Dorothy Roberts, John Robertson, and Carl Schneider, and was born with
the special support of David Faigman, Ugo Mattei, and Kameshwar Poolla, as well as the able
research assistance of my students Lauren Gibson and Minal Shah, and my librarian Mary
Glennon. I am also indebted to Justice Harry A. Blackmun,'who started me on this path and
whose wisdom and encouragement made this work possible.
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dimension. By attaching the right of privacy to entire relationships rather than
to isolated individuals, Professor Rao both explains existing jurisprudence and
offers a fresh mode of analysis to resolve some seemingly intractable problems
posed by assisted reproduction.
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional right of privacy is currently misunderstood. It is
typically invoked in support of the individual's right to marry, to form a
family, to procreate or not procreate, to rear children, and to engage in
sexual activity. Indeed, privacy has become synonymous with individual
rights to these various activities. But it is a mistake to equate privacy with
a general constitutional right to engage in any or all of these important
activities free from governmental interference.' Rather, the constitutional
right to privacy simply casts a mantle of immunity from state interference
around certain intimate and consensual relationships Although privacy is
often perceived as a personal right, the prevailing concept fails to capture
privacy's social dimension. Privacy is not a right attached to isolated
individuals; it nurtures social institutions, such as marriage and the family,
that mediate between the individual and the state.
Indeed, the right of privacy is a principle concerning the allocation of
power between individuals and the state, not the allocation of power
1. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(declaring that "the right to privacy is more than the mere aggregation of a number of
entitlements to engage in specific behavior"); cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 737, 784 (1989) (arguing that the right to privacy consists not of the freedom to perform
certain fundamental acts, but rather "the ... freedom not to have one's life too totally deter-
mined by... [the] state").
2. Intimacy and consent are clearly necessary, but they may not be sufficient conditions to
invoke the right to privacy under prevailing doctrine, for not all intimate and consensual rela-
tionships currently receive constitutional protection. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196
(upholding a Georgia statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (upholding a federal law against polygamy). But cf. Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado initiative that barred state and local laws protecting
homosexuals unless approved by a majority of the state's electorate on the grounds that such
status-based discrimination against homosexuals was irrational); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67
(Haw. 1993) (protecting homosexual's right to marry a person of the same sex). What further
conditions are required under existing privacy doctrine remains to be seen. See Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (looking to "the most specific
level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified" in order to determine what rights receive constitutional shelter under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
3. Cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK passim (1991) (arguing that the peculiarly
American rhetoric of rights is missing the important language of relationship and responsibility).
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among individuals.4 Individuals joined in a close relationship possess pri-
vacy rights against the state, not against each other. Privacy protects the
freedom to create and maintain intimate associations apart from the state,5
not the right to prevent the state mediation of conflicts within existing
relationships. Accordingly, once dissent divides the individuals in a rela-
tionship, their privacy disappears, for the state is necessarily entangled in
assigning their relative rights and responsibilities. Furthermore, privacy is
the quintessential negative right-a right to be free from governmen-
tal interference with intimate associations. This very principle, however,
implies an important limitation: The right of privacy fails to support
individuals who are calling upon the state to assist them actively in their
interactions with other individuals.
In the context of assisted reproduction, therefore, the right to privacy
shelters procreation, but only when it occurs within the confines of a close
personal association. There is, however, no right to enter into the com-
merce of reproduction-to trade freely in sperm, eggs, embryos, and gesta-
tional services-because such activities do not implicate private
relationships.' In addition, the right to privacy protects the reproductive
activities of individuals who are allied against the state. But if the indi-
viduals involved in reproduction are at odds, the right to privacy cannot
insulate them, either from the state or from the claims of one another.
7
This Article examines the right to privacy in the context of assisted
reproduction, developing the preceding arguments in six steps. Part I sets
forth the case law regarding the constitutional status of assisted reproduc-
4. See Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy Case for a
Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006, 1011 (1987) (arguing that
the right to privacy functions to police the boundary between public and private, "defining pri-
vate spheres within which individuals must be left free from government interference").
5. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 626 n.8
(1980) (arguing that "a concern to protect this freedom [of intimate association] lies behind
many of the Supreme Court's... decisions in the areas of marriage, procreation, and parent-child
relations").
6. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1984) (denying con-
stitutional protection to members of a professional club who sought to associate only with others
of the same sex because the organization involved the participation of strangers and was not suf-
ficiently small, selective, and secluded from others to merit privacy rights); Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1974) (holding that six unrelated college roommates did not have a
constitutional right to reside together).
7. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129-30 (holding that privacy does not protect the
right of biological father to parent a child born to an existing union between a married woman
and her husband); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equity & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
855-56 (1977) (holding that privacy does not protect the foster parents' right to retain custody
over children in their care for more than one year, when opposed by claims of the biological
parents).
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tion. Part II describes the historical development of the right to privacy
and sketches out its modem parameters. After distilling privacy's central
principle-the protection of intimate and consensual relationships-Part
III develops a relational concept of privacy that assigns the right to entire
associations rather than to isolated individuals. Part IV distinguishes cases
involving contraception, abortion, and compulsory sterilization-issues
that implicate rights of bodily integrity as well as equal protection prin-
ciples. Part V considers the claim that the Constitution guarantees
reproductive autonomy but finds no general right to procreate or not
procreate; instead, the rights of, privacy, bodily autonomy, and equal
protection work together in certain contexts to afford protection to
discrete acts involved in procreation. Part VI ends by applying the right of
relational privacy to the process of assisted reproduction, concluding that
many current practices may not receive constitutional protection.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
A. Reproduction with the Assistance of Technology
A married couple's8 choice to reproduce by means of sexual inter-
course clearly merits constitutional protection under current privacy doc-
trine.9 It is less clear, however, whether the right of privacy also extends
to reproduction without sex-reproduction that takes place with the assis-
8. Whether the act of sexual reproduction continues to receive constitutional protection
when it occurs outside the boundaries of marriage is an open question. See Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5 (1977) (conceding that "the Court has not definitively
answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state
statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults") (internal quotation
omitted) (alteration in original). The Supreme Court's repeated endorsement of laws prohibit-
ing fornication and adultery, however, suggests that the prevailing formulation of privacy may
not encompass all procreative activity. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986)
(refusing to hold that the privacy cases "stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual
conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription"); Paris
Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973) (declining to find that the Constitution
"incorporates the proposition that conduct involving consenting adults only is always beyond
state regulation"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(declaring that "the constitutionality of [Connecticut statutes prohibiting fornication and
adultery] is beyond doubt"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the suggestion that "adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from
criminal enquiry, however privately practiced").
9. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (suggesting, though not expressly affirming, that sex-
ual reproduction falls within the scope of marital privacy).
1080 45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1077 (1998)
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tance of technologies,'0 such as artificial insemination," intracytoplasmic
sperm injection, 2 or in vitro fertilization."
1. Artificial Insemination
Courts have seldom addressed the constitutionality of restrictions on
techniques of assisted reproduction. The only cases that directly confront
the question whether a married couple possesses the right to procreate by
means of artificial insemination with the husband's own sperm involve
prisoners. In Goodwin v. Turner,'.4 for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit considered a prisoner's claim that he be allowed to
provide a container of semen to his wife for the purpose of artificial
insemination. The prison refused to afford its male inmates access to arti-
ficial insemination because of the expenses that would be incurred if female
inmates were accorded the same rights as well.'5 Assuming that there exists
a fundamental "right to procreate by means of artificial insemination [that]
actually survives incarceration,"" the court nevertheless rejected the pris-
oner's claim. It found the prison's policy against assisted reproduction to
be constitutional because it was "reasonably related to ... the legitimate
10. Some scholars believe that the Constitution protects a right to reproduce with the
assistance of technology. Professor John Robertson is the most prominent proponent of this
theory: he advocates an expansive principle of procreative liberty that encompasses "a negative
constitutional right to use a wide variety of reproductive technologies to have offspring." JOHN
A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOL-
OGIES 38-39 (1994). Indeed, Robertson argues that almost every practice necessary to procreate
should receive constitutional protection. Thus, he finds a constitutional right to purchase sperm,
eggs, and gestational services, and even to enforce preconception agreements to rear offspring.
See id. at 131-41; see also John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 942 (1986); John A. Robertson, In the
Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437 (1990); John A. Robertson,
Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405
(1983). For a critique of Robertson's theory, see Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1473 (1995).
11. Artificial insemination is the oldest and most firmly entrenched of all the "new" repro-
ductive technologies. Indeed, artificial insemination hardly qualifies as a technology at all, for it
can be readily accomplished by a woman acting alone with such easily obtainable implements as
a syringe or a turkey baster.
12. Intracytoplasmic sperm injection is a process whereby individual sperm are injected
directly into the egg, enabling conception even in cases of low sperm count or impaired motility.
13. In vitro fertilization (IVF) requires the surgical removal of eggs after ovarian stimula-
tion, fertilization with sperm in a laboratory, and subsequent implantation in the uterus.
14. 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990).
15. See id. at 1400.
16. Id. at 1398.
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penological interest of treating all inmates equally, to the extent
possible."'
7
This ruling was followed by Anderson v. Vasquez, 8 in which a federal
district court denied death row prisoners the option to preserve their sperm
for artificial insemination on the ground that the fundamental right to pro-
create is inconsistent with imprisonment and hence does not survive incar-
ceration. And in Percy v. New Jersey Department of Corrections,' 9 a state
appellate court assumed that prisoners possess a fundamental right to pro-
create, but determined that security risks, scarce resources, and equal pro-
tection concerns justified a prison policy prohibiting inmate procreation
through artificial insemination.
By uniformly upholding such prison regulations, these decisions deny
even married inmates the ability to reproduce by means of artificial
insemination using their own sperm. Because these decisions are confined
to the penal context, however, they do not address the question of whether
there exists a right to procreate outside of prison. Yet, cases involving cus-
tody and visitation rights to children born of artificial insemination with
donor sperm imply that there may be a right to use artificial insemination
to conceive a child, even if there is no corollary right exclusively to parent
the resulting child.0
2. In Vitro Fertilization
Several courts have strongly suggested that privacy protects at least a
married couple's right to conceive by using in vitro fertilization to unite
their own gametes. In Smith v. Hartigan,2' a federal district court dismissed
a lawsuit brought by a married couple challenging the constitutionality of
one provision of the Illinois Abortion Law,"2 which arguably limited in
17. Id. at 1400.
18. 827 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
19. 651 A.2d 1044 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
20. See discussion infra Part 1.B. 1 (describing sperm donor cases).
21. 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. 111. 1983).
22. The challenged statute, section 6(7) of the Illinois Abortion Law, provided:
Any person who intentionally causes the fertilization of a human ovum by a human
sperm outside the body of a living human female shall.., be deemed to have the care
and custody of a child for the purposes of Section 4 of the Act to Prevent and Punish
Wrongs to Children.
Id. at 159-60. Section 4 of the Act to Prevent and Punish Wrongs to Children made it unlawful
for any person having the care or custody of a child to permit or cause the health or life of the
child to be endangered. See id.
1082 45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1077 (1998)
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vitro fertilization (IVF). 23 In that case, the Illinois attorney general inter-
preted the statute to allow IVF, but the court implied that the law would
have been unconstitutional otherwise.24 Although Smith left open the
question whether there exists a right to procreate by means of IVF, a subse-
quent case, Lifchez v. Hartigan,"5 answered this question in the affirmative
by striking down a different provision of the Illinois Abortion Law on the
ground that it impermissibly restricted assisted reproduction in violation of
the Constitution. In that case, the court expressly affirmed that the consti-
tutional right to privacy encompasses procreative freedom, stating:
Section 6(7) of the Illinois Abortion Law is... unconstitutional
because it impermissibly restricts a woman's fundamental right of pri-
vacy, in particular, her right to make reproductive choices free of
governmental interference with those choices....
... It takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of
constitutionally protected choices that includes the right to have
access to contraceptives, there must be included within that cluster
the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about,
rather than prevent, pregnancy.... By encroaching upon this pro-
tected zone of privacy, [section] 6(7) is unconstitutional.
26
Taken together, these cases suggest that the right to privacy includes
a married couple's choice to reproduce with the assistance of technology.
The fact that assisted reproductive techniques receive constitutional pro-
tection, however, does not necessarily mean that the right to privacy also
extends to procreation with the assistance of gamete donors and surrogate
gestators. Such situations implicate third parties who may lack intimate
23. See id. at 159.
24. See id. The court declined to consider the couple's claim that the Illinois statute
unconstitutionally burdened their fundamental right to procreate because the law, as definitively
interpreted by the Illinois attorney general, permitted them to conceive by means of in vitro
fertilization. See id.
25. 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. I1. 1990). The court in Lifchez struck down a provision of the
Illinois Abortion Law prohibiting experimentation unless therapeutic to the fetus on the grounds
that the law was unconstitutionally vague and impermissibly restricted the privacy right to make
reproductive choices free of governmental interference by limiting the range of reproductive
techniques available to potential parents.
The state of Illinois subsequently chose not to appeal the district court's ruling. Moreover,
when a private citizen attempted to appeal on behalf of himself and his unborn child, the court
of appeals held that he lacked standing to compel enforcement of the criminal law because the
defense of state statutes is entrusted solely to the state's attorneys; private citizens disappointed
by the decisions of their public officials have redress only at the ballot box. See Lifchez, No.
90-2208, 1990 WL 130686, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 10, 1990).
26. ifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376-77.
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associations with the progenitors and who may themselves acquire coun-
tervailing interests of constitutional magnitude.
B. Noncoital Reproduction with Donors and Surrogates
1. Disputes with Sperm Donors
As the following cases make clear, the right to privacy extends at most
to conception that takes place with the assistance of donated gametes; it
does not also include the right to enlist unwilling individuals to participate
in the venture, nor does it encompass the right to maintain an exclusive
relationship with the resulting child.
In Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 7 for example, a California court refused
to divest a sperm donor of parental rights when he was known to the
child's biological mother and supplied his sperm directly to her for self-
insemination. The court ruled that the sperm donor was the child's legal
father, despite an alleged oral agreement surrendering his parental rights
and despite the existence of a California statute requiring the donor to be
treated in law as if he were not the child's father when his semen was pro-
vided to a licensed physician. The court further held that the licensed
physician requirement did not violate the woman's "right to procreative
choice ... encompassed by the constitutional right of privacy" because it
imposed no restriction on her ability to conceive a child by means of arti-
ficial insemination: "The statute simply addressted] the.., legal status of
the semen donor." Nor did the court's ruling infringe upon the woman's
right "to family autonomy, encompassed by the constitutional right to pri-
vacy," because the sperm donor in this case was not excluded from her
family "either by anonymity, by agreement, or by the parties' conduct."' 9
To the contrary, he was permitted to develop a relationship with both
mother and child by maintaining contact with the mother during the
course of her pregnancy and by visiting the child monthly after birth, pur-
chasing baby furniture, and creating a trust fund for the child.
Similarly, in Thomas S. v. Robin Y., the New York Appellate Divi-
sion held that a sperm donor who was known to the child as her biological
father and who spent time with the child with the consent of her biological
mother was entitled to seek visitation with the child, even though he had
27. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
28. Id. at 537.
29. Id. at 536.
30. 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (App. Div. 1994).
1084 45 UCLA LAw REVIEW 107 7 (1998)
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apparently agreed to relinquish all parental rights. Indeed, the court inti-
mated that any other interpretation of New York law might violate the
sperm donor's constitutional rights as the child's biological father.
Therefore, even if the right to privacy extends to use of the technique
of artificial insemination with donor sperm in order to conceive a child, it
does not also empower one biological parent to bar the other from contact
with a child born from assisted reproduction, regardless whether the parties
agreed upon this result. On the contrary, the artificial insemination cases
suggest that terminating the sperm provider's parental rights pursuant to
such an agreement, at least when he has come forward and made signifi-
cant efforts to participate in the parenting process, may violate his own
constitutional right to rear his biological child." Furthermore, just as pri-
vacy does not protect the right to exclude some progenitors from a child's
family, it also does not protect the right to compel other individuals to
become part of a child's family against their will. Accordingly, the right to
privacy does not authorize a married woman who is artificially inseminated
with donor sperm without her husband's knowledge or consent to have her
husband declared the legal father of the child if that would eviscerate his
31
own right not to procreate.
2. Custody Battles for Frozen Embryos
The frozen embryo cases reinforce the conclusion that the boundaries
of the right to privacy are staked out by the countervailing interests of
other individuals. Davis v. Davis," for example, demonstrates that privacy
does not protect a general right to procreate-to conceive and gestate a
pregnancy-if it conflicts with or is opposed by another person's right not
to procreate. Davis involved a divorced couple's dispute over the disposi-
31. If it is unconstitutional to divest a sperm donor of parental rights even when he con-
sented to this result, then it necessarily follows that it must also be unconstitutional to terminate
the parental rights of a sperm donor who expressly reserved the right to participate in rearing his
biological child. See C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio C.P. 1994) (suggesting that
interpreting an artificial insemination statute to extinguish the parental rights of a known sperm
donor who agreed to retain his relationship with the child would be unconstitutional); McIntyre
v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 244 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that an Oregon statute denying a
sperm donor paternal rights because he was not married to the child's mother was unconstitu-
tional as applied to a known donor who allegedly possessed an agreement with the mother to
participate in raising the child).
32. See Witbeck-Wildhagen v. Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122, 126 (111. App. Ct. 1996)
(refusing to declare the husband of a married woman who was artificially inseminated without
the husband's knowledge or consent to be child's legal father because that would violate the hus-
band's right not to procreate).
33. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
Relational Privacy 1085
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tion of seven cryogenically preserved embryos remaining from the in vitro
fertilization process. In the case, the Tennessee Supreme Court empha-
sized that "the right of procreation is a vital part of an individual's right to
privacy" and explained that this "right of procreational autonomy is com-
posed of two rights of equal significance-the right to procreate and the
right to avoid procreation."- The court proceeded to balance these con-
flicting constitutional interests, ruling that the husband's right not to pro-
create-to avoid genetic parenthood--outweighed his former wife's right
to procreate by donating the extra embryos to others to gestate and rear:
Balanced against Junior Davis's interest in avoiding [genetic] parent-
hood is Mary Sue Davis's interest in donating the preembryos
to another couple for implantation. Refusal to permit donation of
the preembryos would impose on her the burden of knowing that the
lengthy IVF procedures she underwent were futile, and that the
preembryos to which she contributed genetic material would never
become children. While this is not an insubstantial emotional bur-
den, we can only conclude that Mary Sue Davis's interest in dona-
tion is not as significant as the interest Junior Davis has in avoiding
parenthood. If she were allowed to donate these preembryos, he
would face a lifetime of either wondering about his parental status or
knowing about his parental status but having no control over it....
The case would be closer if Mary Sue Davis were seeking to use
the preembryos herself, but only if she could not achieve parenthood
by any other reasonable means.35
The court distinguished cases striking down spousal consent require-
ments for abortion as unconstitutional, stating that "Inlone of the concerns
about a woman's bodily integrity that have previously precluded men from
controlling abortion decisions is applicable here."3'6 In addition, the court
suggested that the interests of the individuals who provide the gametes
necessarily trump those of the state:
[Tihe state's interest in potential human life is insufficient to justify
an infringement on the gamete-providers' procreational auton-
omy.... [N]o other person or entity has an interest sufficient to
permit interference with the gamete-providers' decision to continue
or terminate the IVF process, because no one else bears the conse-
quences of these decisions in the way that the gamete-providers 
do.37
34. ld. at 600-01.
35. Id. at 604.
36. Id. at 601 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976)).
37. Id. at 602.
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In Kass v. Kass,3 ' on the other hand, a New York court adopted a radi-
cally different approach to resolve a similar controversy, awarding five fro-
zen embryos to their genetic mother to be implanted and carried to term
over the objections of her ex-husband, the genetic father. Like the Davis
court, the Kass court recognized "the existence of a constitutionally pro-
tected right of privacy involving 'procreational autonomy', a right which
includes both a 'right to procreate' and a 'right to avoid procreation."'3 9 For
the Kass court, however, the dispositive factor was the status of the
embryos, not the manner of their conception.' The court explained that a
husband has no right to procreate or avoid procreation following an in vivo
fertilization because he cannot compel or prevent an abortion: "The simple
fact of the matter is that an in vivo husband's right. and control over the
procreative process ends with ejaculation. From that moment... the fetus'
fate rests with the mother to the exclusion of all others."'" But if a husband
has no right to procreate or not to procreate when conception takes place
within his wife's body, the court reasoned that he gains no additional rights
simply because conception occurs externally, in a test tube or petri dish:
[There is no legal, ethical, or logical reason why an in vitro fertiliza-
tion should give rise to additional rights on the part of the husband.
From a propositional standpoint it matters little whether the
ovum/sperm union takes place in the private darkness of a fallopian
tube or the public glare of a petri dish. Fertilization is fertilization
and fertilization of the ovum is the inception of the reproductive
process. Biological life exists from that moment forward.... The
rights of the parties are dependent upon the nature of the zygote not
the stage of its development or its location. To deny a husband
rights while an embryo develops in the womb and grant a right
to destroy while it is in a hospital freezer is to favor situs over
substance. 42
Consequently, the court ruled that "the rights of the wife must be consid-
ered paramount and her wishes with respect to disposition [of the embryos]
must prevail."43 In an attempt to justify its departure from Davis v. Davis,
the court noted that "[tihe cornerstone of the Davis opinion is the in vitro
38. No. 19658-93, 1995 WL 110368, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995).
39. Id. at *2.
40. See id. (stating that "the key to an intelligent discussion is the question of whether
there is a conceptual or propositional difference between the product of an in vitro fertilization
and the product of an in vivo fertilization").
41. Id.
42. Id. at *3.
43. Id.
Relational Privacy 1087
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husband's constitutional right to avoid procreation."" But the Kass court
denied the existence of such a right, arguing that "a 'right to avoid
procreation' cannot logically survive the initial act of procrea-
tion.... [Otherwise] the right has been transformed from one founded in
restraint into a right to take positive steps to terminate a potential human
life.
,,4
Kass illustrates the flaw in mechanically transplanting constitutional
rights from one situation to another, without attention to the context or to
the consequences for the constitutional interests of others. The Kass court
erred in dismissing the significance of the place and method of conception.
Because a wife's right to procreate overrides her husband's right not to
procreate when conception takes place in vivo, the court mistakenly con-
cluded that her right to procreate must also outweigh his right not to
procreate when conception occurs in vitro. But a vast gulf separates these
two modes of conception, for protection of a husband's right not to
procreate in the latter context poses no threat to the constitutional
interests of his wife, specifically to her right to be free from physical
invasions of her body. What the Kass court failed to recognize is that
vindication of the husband's right not to procreate by discard of the frozen
embryos would not violate his wife's right to bodily autonomy. This lack of
attention to context is problematic because constitutional rights do not
exist in a vacuum: they are not unidimensional-one size does not fit all.
Rather, the contours of constitutional rights may be drawn only with close
regard to their context 4 and consequences for the interests of others.
47
Like the cases involving artificial insemination with donor sperm, the
frozen embryo disputes demonstrate that the right to privacy is bounded by
the constitutional interests of others. The right to privacy ends at the
point when individuals within a protected relationship assert contradictory
44. Id. at *4.
45. Id. at *3.
46. See Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1364-69 (1984) (arguing
that rights do not exist in the abstract but instead depend upon their context, so that "relatively
small changes in technology would make it impossible-or at least very difficult-to talk about a
right to an abortion").
47. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L.
REV. 343, 360-62 (1993) (arguing that individual rights are conceptually interconnected with
governmental powers, so that the contours of constitutional rights are determined by the scope of
government's power to protect countervailing interests); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 124 n.4 (1989) (refusing to "look[] at the act which is assertedly the subject of a liberty
interest in isolation from its effect upon other people").
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interests. Thus privacy does not protect one person's right to procreate if
that would entail denial of another person's right not to procreate4 s or dep-
rivation of another person's parental rights.49
3. Conflicts over Surrogacy Contracts
Privacy's limits are most apparent in the surrogacy context, in which
multiple parties may raise conflicting constitutional claims. In In re Baby
M., ° the foremost example of a surrogacy agreement that soured, the New
Jersey Supreme Court declined to enforce a contract that required a woman
to be artificially inseminated, to carry her pregnancy to term, and to sur-
render her child at birth to the biological father in exchange for a fee of
$10,000, holding that such surrogacy contracts conflict with New Jersey
law and public policy. The court rejected the biological father's argument
that his right to procreate entitled him to enforcement of the contract,
stating:
We find that the right of procreation does not extend as far as
claimed ....
... The right to procreate very simply is the right to have natural
children, whether through sexual intercourse or artificial insemina-
tion. It is no more than that. Mr. Stem has not been deprived of
that right. Through artificial insemination of Mrs. Whitehead, Baby
M is his child. The custody, care, companionship, and nurturing
that follow birth are not parts of the right to procreation .... 51
The court proceeded to balance the parties' competing interests, ruling that
a biological father's right to procreate cannot extend so far as to deprive
the biological mother of her own right of procreation:
To assert that Mr. Stem's right of procreation gives him the right to
the custody of Baby M would be to assert that Mrs. Whitehead's
right of procreation does not give her the right to the custody of Baby
M; it would be to assert that the constitutional right of procreation
includes within it a constitutionally protected contractual right to
destroy someone else's right of procreation.2
48. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
49. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986); Thomas S. v. Robin Y.,
618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (App. Div. 1994).
50. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
51. Id. at 1253.
52. Id.
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Suggesting that constitutional rights are qualified by their effects upon the
interests of other parties," the court concluded that "[tihere is nothing in
our culture or society that even begins to suggest a fundamental right on
the part of the father to the custody of the child as part of his right to pro-
create when opposed by the claim of the mother to the same child."" By
refusing to enforce the surrogacy contract, moreover, the court obviated
the need to address the biological mother's counterclaim that enforcement
would violate her own constitutional right to the companionship of her
child. 5 Instead, the court adjudicated the case as if it were a custody dis-
pute over a coitally produced child, holding that the child's best interests
required that she reside with her biological father while awarding visitation
rights to her biological mother. 6
Similarly, in Johnson v. Calvert," the California Supreme Court con-
fronted the question who is the mother of a child conceived from the egg of
one woman but gestated in the womb of another. Faced with such a con-
flict, the court ruled that the woman who intended to parent the child was
the child's mother under California law."8 The court rejected the gesta-
tional mother's argument that this result deprived her of her constitutional
right to the companionship of her child on the grounds that "[s]ociety has
not traditionally protected the right of a woman who gestates and delivers
a baby pursuant to an agreement with a couple who supply the zygote from
which the baby develops and who intend to raise the child as their own." 9
Indeed, "[tlo the extent that tradition has a bearing on the present case,"
the court declared, "it supports the claim of the couple who exercise their
right to procreate in order to form a family of their own, albeit through
novel medical procedures. ' 60 The Johnson court acknowledged the clash
between the competing constitutional interests of the parties and con-
cluded that protecting the rights of the gestational mother would necessar-
ily diminish the rights of the child's genetic parents: "[Ilf we were to
conclude that Anna enjoys some sort of liberty interest in the companion-
ship of the child, then the liberty interests of Mark and Crispina, the
53. See id. at 1254 (stating that "[our conclusion may thus be understood as illustrating
that a person's rights of privacy and self-determination are qualified by the effect on innocent
third persons of the exercise of those rights").
54. Id.
55. See id. at 1255.
56. See id. at 1261-63.
57. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
58. See id. at 782.
59. Id. at 786.
60. Id.
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child's natural parents, in their procreative choices and their relationship
with the child would perforce be infringed."6' The court also suggested that
the choice to enter into a surrogacy contract is not part of the right to pri-
vacy, but merely the provision of a commercial service:
mhe choice to gestate and deliver a baby for its genetic parents
pursuant to a surrogacy agreement is [not] the equivalent, in
constitutional weight, of the decision whether to bear a child of
one's own.... A woman who enters into a gestational surrogacy
arrangement is not exercising her own right to make procreative
choices; she is agreeing to provide a necessary and profoundly
important service without (by definition) any expectation that she
will raise the resulting child as her own.
62
The court's statement intimates that privacy does not protect an individ-
ual's right to enter into surrogacy contracts because such contracts are
commercial transactions, not intimate associations.
In re Baby M. and Johnson are not unique; other surrogacy cases
strengthen the conclusion that privacy does not protect the individual's
right to enter into and enforce surrogacy contracts. Accordingly, several
state courts have upheld statutes that prohibit surrogacy agreements, prof-
fering a variety of different rationales.6 In Doe v. Kelley,6 for example, the
court considered the constitutionality of a Michigan statute prohibiting the
exchange of money in connection with adoption. A married couple chal-
lenged the statute on the grounds that it interfered with their right to
reproduce by means of surrogacy, but the court found the statute to be
constitutional because it did not forbid conception of a child-it merely
precluded the payment of consideration to transfer parental rights over the
child:
While the decision to bear or beget a child [is] a fundamental
interest protected by the right of privacy, we do not view this right as
61. Id. The lower court also commented on the clash between competing rights in this
case, bluntly remarking:
[Lliberty interests have a way of bumping into each other in cases involving husbands,
wives, and unmarried individuals when all are claiming parental rights. To hold that
Anna has a liberty interest in her relationship with the child is to diminish the liberty
interest of Mark and Crispina in their relationship with the child.
Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 380 (Ct. App. 1991).
62. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 787.
63. But see Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (striking
down an Arizona statute prohibiting surrogacy contracts and declaring the surrogate to be the
legal mother of the child on equal protection grounds, because the statute afforded the genetic
father the opportunity to prove paternity while denying the genetic mother any opportunity to
prove maternity).
64. 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
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a valid prohibition to state interference in the [parties'] contractual
arrangement. The statute... does not directly prohibit John Doe
and Mary Roe from having the child as planned. It acts instead to
preclude plaintiffs from paying consideration... to change the legal
status of the child .... We do not perceive this goal as within the
realm of fundamental interests protected by the right to privacy from
reasonable governmental regulation."
In another case, In re Paul,66 a New York court upheld a similar statute,
basing its decision upon precisely the same rationale.67 Doe v. Attorrey
General" likewise determined that a subsequent Michigan statute expressly
outlawing paid surrogacy was also constitutional, though for a different rea-
son. The court conceded that the statute encroached upon the constitu-
tionally protected zone of privacy, which guarantees "freedom from
government interference in matters of marriage, family, procreation, and
intimate association."'69 Concluding that "there are compelling interests
sufficient to warrant governmental intrusion into the otherwise protected
area of privacy in the matter of procreation,"' however, the court upheld
the statute as narrowly tailored to achieve the state's interests in protecting
the best interests of children, preventing them from becoming commodi-
ties, and precluding the exploitation of women."
The only decision to date holding that constitutional privacy protects
the right to enter into and enforce surrogacy contracts is the discredited
trial court opinion in In re Baby M." In that opinion, which was later
overturned by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Judge Sorkow reasoned: "if
one has a right to procreate coitally, then one has the right to reproduce
non-coitally. If it is the reproduction that is protected, then the means of
reproduction are also to be protected."" Therefore, although "a state could
regulate... the circumstances under which parties enter into reproductive
contracts, it could not ban or refuse to enforce such transactions altogether
without compelling reason."74  Rather, the court suggested that a state's
65. Id. at 441 (citation omitted).
66. 550N.Y.S.2d 815 (Fam. Ct. 1990).
67. See id. at 817 (upholding a New York statute prohibiting the payment of money in con-
nection with adoption) (citing Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)).
68. 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
69. Id. at 486.
70. Id. at 487-88; see also id. at 486 (suggesting that privacy guarantees "freedom from gov-
ernment interference in matters of marriage, family, procreation, and intimate association").
71. Seeid.at486-87.
72. 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987).
73. Id. at 1164.
74. Id.
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prohibition of money payments or refusal to enforce surrogacy contracts
would unconstitutionally interfere with the procreative liberty of childless
couples, which falls within the protected realm of privacy.5
II. THE PARAMETERS OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
If the Constitution guarantees a right of procreation, such a guarantee
must fall within the ambit of the amorphous right to privacy, which has
been variously located in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,76 the Ninth Amendment, 77 and the penumbras and emana-
tions surrounding several other specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
78
This right of privacy is not to be confused with the expectation of privacy
in one's home and person provided by the Fourth Amendment,79 or with
the freedom from unwanted publicity granted by tort law.80
A. Privacy's Origins
Privacy's earliest origins lie in two Lochner-era s' cases that established
the right of parents to teach their children foreign languages and send
them to private schools. In Meyer v. Nebraska,8 ' the Supreme Court
declared for the first time that the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes "not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual.., to marry, establish a
home and bring up children."8'3 Pierce v. Society of Sisters4 reaffirmed that
due process protects "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control" because "[tihe
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."8' These
75. See id. at 1163-64.
76. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
77. See id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
78. See id. at 484 (Douglas, J.) (locating the right to privacy in penumbras and emanations
surrounding the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
79. See, e.g., Katz vt. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
80. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
81. Lochner v.-New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
82. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
83. Id. at 399.
84. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
85. Id. at 534-35.
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cases, however, were premised primarily upon the right of teachers and
schools to engage in their chosen occupation, and not upon the family's
right to privacy.
The constitutional right of privacy actually surfaced several decades
later. In Poe v. Ullman,s6 the Supreme Court confronted challenges by a
married couple and their physician to the constitutionality of a Connecti-
cut law criminalizing the use of contraceptives. Because the law had not
been enforced in over eighty years, the Court dismissed the case for lack of
a justiciable controversy.87  Dissenting from the Court's decision, Justice
Harlan would have struck down the statute as "an intolerable and unjustifi-
able invasion of privacy in the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an
individual's personal life. ''ss He grounded his dissent in previous decisions
protecting a "private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,"8 9
arguing that "it is difficult to imagine what is more private or more inti-
mate than a husband and wife's marital relations."9"
Although references to Poe usually quote from Justice Harlan's famous
dissent,9' the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas also merits mention.
Justice Douglas agreed that the Connecticut statute infringed upon the
right of privacy by "reach[ing] into the intimacies of the marriage relation-
ship."9 But Justice Douglas envisioned privacy as a right that "emanates
from the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live" and
intimated that its purpose is to protect intermediate institutions that stand
between the individual and the state, such as the family.9 In so doing, pri-
vacy preserves separate spheres of power, functioning as a bulwark against
totalitarianism:
One of the earmarks of the totalitarian understanding of society is
that it seeks to make all subcommunities-family, school, business,
press, church-completely subject to control by the State. The State
then is not one vital institution among others... [but] seeks to be
coextensive with family and school, press, business community, and
86. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
87. See id. at 508 ("Eighty years of Connecticut history demonstrate a... tacit agree-
ment ... [not] to press the enforcement of this statute[,J depriv[ing] these controversies of the
immediacy which is an indispensable condition of constitutional adjudication.").
88. Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 552 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-50 (1992).
92. Poe, 367 U.S. at 519 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 521-22.
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the Church, so that all of these component interest groups
are... reduced to organs and agencies of the State.
94
Justice Douglas's opinion thus reveals the principle underlying the right to
privacy and illuminates the deep connection between privacy and
democracy.
But it was not until 1965 that the constitutional right of privacy
achieved explicit recognition. In Griswold v. Connecticut,95 a majority of
the Court" employed privacy to strike down the very statute that had been
challenged a few years earlier in Poe v. Ullman.97 Justice Douglas, writing
for the Court, found the right of privacy lurking in the penumbras formed
by emanations from several specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.98 He
concluded that marriage is a "relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. '' 9 By penalizing
a married couple's use of contraception, the Connecticut law unconstitu-
tionally invaded their privacy.1' ° Justice Douglas ended his opinion with a
tribute to marriage:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
94. Id. (quoting Robert L. Calhoun, Democracy and Natural Law, 5 NAT. L.F. 31,
36(1960)).
95. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
96. Justice Douglas authored the majority opinion, which struck down the Connecticut
statute pursuant to the right of privacy. He was joined, by Chief Justice Warren, as well as Jus-
tices Brennan and Goldberg. Justices Harlan and White concurred separately on the ground that
the Connecticut statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
97. The Connecticut statute provided that "[any person who uses any drug, medicinal
article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty
dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and
imprisoned." Id. at 480 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958 rev.) (repealed 1971)).
98. According to Justice Douglas:
[SIpecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create
zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one .... The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quarter-
ing of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the consent of the owner is
another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."
Id. at 484 (citations omitted). He concluded that these provisions "create zones of privacy." Id.
99. Id. at 485.
100. Seeid.
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coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and inti-
mate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes
a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an asso-
ciation for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.'
0'
Though generally dismissed as an afterthought, this passage suggests that
privacy's core purpose is to protect personal relationships. This under-
standing of privacy is confirmed by Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton,'O° which
declared:
[The constitutionally protected privacy of family, marriage, mother-
hood, procreation, and child rearing is not just concerned with a
particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship. Such
protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital, the
hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to inti-
macy involved.
10 3
Consequently, the Court rejected the customers' claim that privacy
protected their right to view pornographic material in commercial
establishments.
B. Privacy's Scope
Griswold and Poe indicate that the right of privacy attempts to pre-
serve the integrity of intimate associations, sheltering them from intrusions
by the state. This reading of the right also comports with subsequent cases
that protect the right to marry,"° the right of extended family members to
reside together,' ° and the right of parents to raise their children free from
ernmental interference,' °6 all under the expansive umbrella of privacy.'
0 7
101. Id.at486.
102. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
103. ld. at 66n.13.
104. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (categorizing "the decision to
marry as among the personal decisions protected by the right of privacy").
105. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (applying careful scru-
tiny to a zoning ordinance preventing a grandmother from living with her grandson because
"when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements, this Court
must examine carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to
which they are served by the challenged regulation").
106. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the right of privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prevent the state from compelling Amish parents to send their children to public schools
beyond the eighth grade); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(holding that parents have a constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children that
prevents the state from requiring public school attendance); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
1096 45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 107 7 (1998)
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In Zablocki v. Redhail,'Os the Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin
law prohibiting residents with unfulfilled child support obligations from
marrying without prior court approval, stating that "the right to marry is
part of the fundamental 'right of privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."' 9 "It is not surprising that the decision
to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions
relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships,"
the Court explained, because "it would make little sense to recognize a
right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with
respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of
the family in our society."" Similarly, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,"'
the Court found unconstitutional a zoning ordinance precluding a grand-
mother from living with her two grandsons on the grounds that "[a] host of
cases.., have consistently acknowledged a 'private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."' 2 And, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,"1 the Court
held that the state could not require Amish parents to send their children
to public school beyond the eighth grade, relying in part upon the consti-
tutional right to privacy."
4
These cases make clear that the right to privacy encompasses close
personal associations. Privacy does not, however, extend to mere collec-
tions of unrelated individuals' or to loose and distant business connec-
tions.' 6  Thus, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas' ruled that the right to
privacy does not protect the living arrangements of a group of college
399-401 (1923) (holding that a state law prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to young
children violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of students and teachers).
107. But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (denying that the consti-
tutional "right of privacy ... extends to homosexual sodomy" because "[njo connection between
family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated").
108. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
109. Id. at 384.
110. Id. at 386.
111. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
112. Id. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
113. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
114. See id. at 234.
115. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974) (upholding a zoning ordi-
nance preventing six unrelated college roommates from living together).
116. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621 (1984) (refusing constitutional
protection to members of a club who sought to associate only with others of the same sex because
the organization involved the participation of strangers and was not sufficiently small, selective,
and secluded from others to merit privacy rights).
117. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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roommates. Similarly, Roberts v. United States Jaycees"' determined that
the right of privacy does not insulate the members of a same-sex club from
state antidiscrimination laws. In the latter case, the Court observed that
the Constitution "afford[s] the formation and preservation of certain kinds
of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from
unjustified interference by the State."" 9 Such associations merit protec-
tion, the Court explained, because they "act as critical buffers between the
individual and the power of the State."'l0 The Court described in detail
the qualities that entitle a relationship to the protection of privacy:
The personal affiliations that exemplify these considerations, and
that therefore suggest some relevant limitations on the relationships
that might be entitled to this sort of constitutional protection, are
those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family-marriage,
childbirth, the raising and education of children, and cohabitation
with one's relatives. Family relationships, by their nature, involve
deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other
individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal
aspects of one's life. Among other things, therefore, they are distin-
guished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of
selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and
seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship. As a
general matter, only relationships with these sorts of qualities are
likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understand-
ing of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal
liberty."'
Accordingly, Roberts declined to afford constitutional shelter to the Jay-
cees's decision to exclude women from their organization. Because the Jay-
cees were "neither small nor selective," and because "much of the activity
central to the formation and maintenance of the association involve[d] the
participation of strangers to that relationship," the Court decided to "place
the organization outside of the category of relationships worthy of this kind
of constitutional protection."'
2]
118. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
119. Id. at 618.
120. ld. at 619.
121. Id. at 619-20 (citations omitted).
122. Id. at 620-21.
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C. Privacy's Limits
In all of the previous cases, the right to privacy shielded the activities
of individuals who were allied against the state. This was true in Stanley v.
Illinois," which required the state to conduct a hearing to determine an
unwed father's fitness as a parent before taking his children away from him
following the death of their mother. 4 Unless he is found unfit, the
Supreme Court reasoned, the interests of the biological father and his chil-
dren would converge in continuing their association.' When the
individuals involved in an intimate relationship are in conflict, however,
the right to privacy cannot immunize them, either against the state or
against each other. Thus, in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 6 the
Court failed to extend the same protection to foster families.' 7 Rejecting
the foster families' claim that they possessed a "'right to familial pri-
vacy'.., in the integrity of their family unit," the Court refused to require
a hearing before the removal of children in their care for more than one
year.'8 To support this result, Smith distinguished between cases involving
families united against the state and those involving discord between fam-
ily members, stating:
It is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest
against arbitrary governmental interference in the family-like asso-
ciations into which they have freely entered .... [but] lilt is quite
another to say that one may acquire such an interest in the face of
another's constitutionally recognized liberty interest ....9
Consequently, the Court declined to protect the foster family, concluding
that "[w]hatever liberty interest might otherwise exist in the foster family
as an institution, that interest must be substantially attenuated where the
123. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidating a statute that automatically deprived unwed fathers
of custody of their children upon the mother's death).
124. See id. at 658.
125. See id. at 654-57; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (requiring
clear and convincing evidence of abuse or neglect before the state can constitutionally terminate
parental rights).
126. 431 U.S. 816, 856 (1977) (sustaining as constitutional state procedures that allowed
children to be removed from foster families with whom they resided for more than one year with-
out a prior hearing).
127. See id.
128. Id. at 842.
129. Id. at 846.
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proposed removal from the foster family is to return the child to his natural
parents."' "
Similarly, in Quilloin v. Walcott,3' the Supreme Court conceded that
the right to privacy prevents governmental interference with a unified
family, declaring that
the Due Process Clause would be offended "[i]f a State were to
attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections
of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness
and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the chil-
dren's best interest."'
32
But the Court applied a different standard in that case because the bio-
logical father's claim was opposed by the child's biological mother and her
husband. The Court ruled that a statute allowing the child to be adopted
by her stepfather upon a mere showing that adoption would be in the
child's best interests was constitutional, for "the result of the adoption in
this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence.'
33
Most recently, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,"4 the Court upheld a Cali-
fornia law conclusively presuming that a child born to a married woman
living with her husband is a child of the marriage, despite the biological
father's claim that this presumption denied him parental rights.'3 ' The
Court acknowledged that prior cases protected the privacy rights of bio-
logical fathers on the rationale that "[t]he significance of the biological
connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other
male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring."' 136 Yet the
Court found this case to be different because the biological father's claim
undermined the integrity of the preexisting marital family: "Where, how-
ever, the child is born into an extant marital family, the natural father's
unique opportunity conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the
husband of the marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to give
categorical preference to the latter.' 31 In such situations, the Court
130. Id. at 846-47.
131. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
132. Id. at 255 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. at 862-63 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
133. Id.
134. 491 U.S. 110(1989).
135. See id. at 129-30.
136. Id. at 128-29 (alteration in original) (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262
(1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id. at 129. Accordingly, the biological father's rights were limited "by the circum-
stance that the mother is, at the time of the child's conception and birth, married to, and
1100 45 UCLA LAw REVIEW 1077 (1998)
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observed, "to provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny
protection to a marital father.""a Faced with a clash between conflicting
claims, the Court concluded that "[i]t is a question of legislative policy and
not constitutional law whether California will allow the presumed parent-
hood of a couple desiring to retain a child conceived within and born into
their marriage to be rebutted."" 9 Here, the state of California decided to
protect the privacy of the marital family at the expense of the biological
father by "excluding inquiries into the child's paternity that would be
destructive of family integrity and privacy."'' Michael H. suggests that the
balance between such contradictory interests should be left to the states as
a matter of policy, rather than imposed by a court under the rubric of con-
stitutional principle.
III. PRIVACY'S PRINCIPLE-A RIGHT OF RELATIONSHIPS
Despite its ample history, the right of privacy displays a paucity of
actual analysis. The constitutional right of privacy originated in the pro-
tection afforded parental rights of child rearing. 4 ' It has evolved into
a right invoked in a wide range of cases involving individuals seeking to142 4
marry, to form a family,' to procreate'" or not to procreate,14 to serve as
parents,'4 to rear children,'47 and to engage in sexual activity. 4  Yet, from
the very beginning, the Supreme Court has never defined precisely what
cohabitating with, another man, both of whom wish to raise the child'as the offspring of their
union." Id.
138. Id. at 130.
139. Id. at 129-30.
140. Id. at 120; see also Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis and the Channeling Function
in Privacy Law, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 97, 119-23 (Stephen E. Gottlieb
ed., 1993) (arguing that the state's interest in channeling individuals into social institutions
such as the marital family may both explain and justify the Court's decision in Michael H. v.
Gerald D.).
141. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
142. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1(1967).
143. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
144. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
145. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
146. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
147. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 405 U.S. 205 (1972).
148. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1101 1997-1998
privacy protects: on the contrary, "[alt the heart of the right to privacy,
there has always been a conceptual vacuum." 49
The prevailing explanation of privacy lies in the concept of person-
hood-the notion that certain decisions central to an individual's personal
identity must be shielded from state interference. "o Professor Jed
Rubenfeld would replace the personhood formulation of privacy with his
own antitotalitarian right to privacy, an approach that looks not to what
a law prohibits but to what it affirmatively requires.' Rubenfeld argues
that, rather than protecting the individual's right to define his or her own
identity, privacy prevents the state from imposing a defined identity upon
individuals by dictating the course of their lives.sz
What is missing from both accounts, however, is a recognition of pri-
vacy's social dimension. 53 The principle that connects the series of cases
involving marriage, the family, procreation, parenting, and sexuality is not
"the right to be let alone."' 54  On the contrary, it is the right to come
149. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 739.
150. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 15-1 to -3, at
1302-12 (2d ed. 1988); J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 699, 702-03; Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26,
38-44 (1976). In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court apparently grounded the constitutional
protection afforded to abortion in this right of personhood, stating:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education .... These
matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a life-
time, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State.
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
151. Rubenfeld recommends that privacy analysis begin "by asking not what is being prohib-
ited, but what is being produced." Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 783. Drawing upon Foucault's con-
ception of power, Rubenfeld suggests that "we look[] not to the negative aspect of the law-the
interdiction by which it formally expresses itself-but at its positive aspect: the real effects that
conformity with the law produces at the level of everyday lives and social practices." Id.
152. See id. at 794 (stating that "[the anti-totalitarian right to privacy... prevents the state
from imposing on individuals a defined identity, whereas the personhood right to privacy ensures
that individuals are free to define their own identities").
153. See FERDINAND DAVID SCHOEMAN, PRIVACY AND SOCIAL FREEDOM 8 (1992) (arguing
that "privacy is important largely because of how it facilitates association with people, not inde-
pendence from people"). Cf. GLENDON, supra note 3 (arguing that the peculiarly American
rhetoric of rights fails to capture the language of relationship and responsibility).
154. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(declaring privacy to be "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men"), overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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together in close consensual relationships. Privacy does not simply guar-
antee individuals the right to sexual, reproductive, and parental autonomy.
It protects the relationships between people that develop in the course of
these activities, rather than the individual's solo right to engage in such
activities.'%
Accordingly, the right of privacy should not attach to isolated indi-
viduals; it belongs instead to close relationships, fostering intimate associa-
tions that mediate between the individual and the state. Privacy should be
viewed as a relational right that "affords] the formation and preservation
of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of
sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.'15 This concept of
relational privacy comports with feminist and communitarian theories that
envision persons not as atomized individuals, but as constituted by and
embedded within a network of close relationships."8 For communitarians,
155. See, e.g., Karst, sup'ra note 5, at 626 n.8 (arguing that "a concern to protect [the free-
dom of intimate association] lies behind many of the Supreme Court's... decisions in the areas
of marriage, procreation, and parent-child relations"); see also Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C.
Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1108 (1990)
(contending that the right to privacy protects the freedom of intimate association rather than
the freedom of procreation, so that "a supposed 'fundamental right' to use a sperm bank would
represent a particularly bold leap" and "a 'right' to enforce a surrogacy contract against a woman
who has changed her mind and wishes to keep her gestational child entails a leap across a consti-
tutionally unbridgeable void").
156. Professor Schoeman draws a similar distinction between the philosophical concepts of
autonomy and privacy, stating:
Both privacy and autonomy suggest that some people have no business crossing a
threshold. But in addition to this, privacy suggests that on the other side of that
threshold there may be something still interpersonal. The point of the restrictions on
access is in large part not to isolate people but to enable them to relate intimately or in
looser associations that serve personal and group goals.
SCHOEMAN, supra note 153, at 21. By describing two types of privacy, Schoeman explicitly
acknowledges both the individual and social aspects of privacy:
Whereas privacy suggests involvement and intimacy, autonomy suggests isolation. That
is to say, privacy has two aspects: "privacy from" and "privacy for." The "privacy from"
aspect suggests restrictions on others' access to a person. But typically there is this other
dimension to the concept, the "privacy for" dimension. For instance, I am accorded
privacy from others vis--vis my domestic life so that I may form deep and special rela-
tionships with family or friends.... Characteristic defenses of privacy as well as charac-
teristic associations with what we mean by privacy suggest interpersonal or even social
affairs.
Id. at 156.
157. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
158. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE. PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (describing the ways in which women exhibit a distinct
relational model of moral development that relies upon their relationships with intimate others);
Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CAL.
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the differences between the individual right of privacy-the right to be left
alone, and the relational right of privacy-the right to connect with
others, may mirror a fundamental conflict between liberalism and
republicanism.. For certain feminists, the distinction between these two
forms of privacy may instead reflect deep divisions in the moral
development of males and females. As Professor Suzanna Sherry writes:
"Whether personal or political, the moral structure of 'mature' males
reflects a paradigm of independent rights, while that of females emphasizes
relational responsibilities.',
5 9
In addition, privacy should not be deemed a purely personal entitle-
ment. It is an umbrella right that shields entire associations rather than
the attributes of individuals. The right of privacy shelters social institu-
tions, such as marriage and the family, that "act as critical buffers between
the individual and the power of the State."' 6  It preserves a sphere of
decentralized decision making, creating a zone of immunity surrounding
close relationships. 6' Privacy is a structural right that protects private
relationships as a mechanism to check excessive governmental power.
This understanding of privacy as a shield protecting intimate associations
that stand between the individual and the state resonates with the theory
underlying the original privacy cases.16 1 It also reveals that privacy is not a
constitutional foundling-a right that emerges from nowhere. Rather, the
right to privacy is an integral part of a broader vision of constitutional law
that regards the Constitution as a document separating and dividing gov-
L. REV. 521, 534 (1989) (setting forth the communitarian defense of the right to homosexual
intimacy).
159. Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA.
L. REv. 543, 591 (1986). Sherry suggests that constitutional law will increasingly come to reflect
recent developments in psychology and literary theory which suggest that a uniquely feminine
perspective exists and is embodied "in the tension between women's primary concern with inti-
macy or connection and men's primary focus on separation or autonomy." Id. at 580.
160. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
161. Cf. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (arguing that property
creates zones within which the state must yield to the owner).
Other interesting parallels may be drawn between the right of privacy and the right of prop-
erty. Privacy, like property, may be understood to consist of a bundle of rights. Privacy, like
property, is a relational right that protects the relationships between people with respect to cer-
tain activities, rather than the individual's right to engage in an activity. And privacy, like
property, preserves a sphere of decentralized decisionmaking free from state intrusion. For a
more extensive comparison of the two rights, see Radhika Rao, Property and Privacy
(forthcoming).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 88-101 (describing the reasoning underlying the dis-
sents of Justices Douglas and Harlan in Poe, as well as Justice Douglas's reasoning in Griswold).
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ernmental power, while simultaneously preserving competing centers of
private power such as the church, the press, and the family.6 '
As a normative principle, privacy yields constitutional protection for
every truly close and consensual association.'" Whenever two or more
individuals are engaged in intimate activities without oppression within
the group and without external effects upon others, they should receive
shelter under the right of relational privacy. This right extends to nontra-
ditional associations as well as to the marital and biological family.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in Reno v. Flores '6 by rejecting the
right of illegal alien children to be released from government detention
centers and placed in the custody of responsible unrelated adults when such
a course posed no threat to the interests of their biological parents. Rela-
tional privacy, by contrast, would protect the formation and preservation of
163. Professor David Richards has articulated one version of such a theory, declaring that:
"Constitutional guarantees not only define and regulate spheres of political self-government
(federalism, separation of powers, and the like) .... [but) also define substantive spheres of moral
self-government wholly immune from state power, for example the rights to conscience and free
speech .... David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 800, 843 (1986). Richards believes that "[this larger conception of essential moral
spheres must include protection of the right of intimate association that underlies ... the tra-
ditional understanding, reflected in Griswold, of a fundamental right to marriage," and he finds
this "understanding [to be] quite explicit in the scope of unenumerated rights assumed by the
Founders." Id. at 843 & n.251; see also Seidman, supra note 4, at 1015 (arguing that the function
of constitutional law is to police the boundary between separate public and private spheres, and
contending that "most modern constitutional law can be reduced to a series of rules prohibiting
government interference with nongovernmental power centers" such as newspapers, churches,
and families).
164. As a description of actual practice, however, this concept of relational privacy clearly
fails to account for every privacy case. While intimacy and consent are clearly necessary, they
may not be sufficient conditions to invoke a right of privacy under prevailing doctrine, for not all
intimate and consensual relationships currently receive constitutional protection. See, e.g.,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a Georgia statute criminalizing homo-
sexual sodomy); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding a federal law against
polygamy). But cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down a Colorado initiative
that barred state and local laws protecting homosexuals unless approved by a majority of the
state's electorate on the grounds that such discrimination against homosexuals was based merely
upon their status and was irrational); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (protecting a
homosexual's right to marry a person of the same sex). What further conditions are required
under existing privacy doctrine remains to be seen. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion) (looking to "the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified" in order to
determine what rights receive constitutional shelter under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
165. 507 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1993) (denying the right to be released into the custody of
responsible adults when there is no available parent, close relative, or legal guardian to illegal
alien children housed in government detention centers).
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such family-like associations against interference from the state, at least in
the absence of any conflict with the biological family.
When privacy is reconceived as a relational right, however, its
boundaries are delineated by the countervailing interests of others within
the protected relationship. Thus, the right to relational privacy ends once
individuals entwined in a close relationship assert contradictory interests.
At that point, they are all exposed to the state, which is necessarily
involved in balancing their relative rights and responsibilities. Accord-
ingly, decisions to marry, to engage in sexual activity, to procreate or not to
procreate, to form a family, and to rear children all receive constitutional
shelter from the state when they occur within the context of intimate and
consensual relationships. Relational privacy, however, does not prevent
state intervention designed to defend the interests of individuals threat-
ened by disagreement within a relationship.
By this reasoning, Bowers v. Hardwick'" is clearly incorrect because it
denied constitutional protection to an intimate and consensual association.
The Court should have struck down the Georgia statute prohibiting homo-
sexual sodomy, not because it deprived Michael Hardwick of the right to be
left alone in his own bedroom, but because it denied homosexuals the same
opportunity to conduct intimate relationships that Griswold afforded mar-
ried couples and that Eisenstadt extended to unmarried individuals.'
67
Under the right of relational privacy, Reynolds v. United States'68 is a much
more difficult case. But laws prohibiting polygamy or incest may not vio-
late this right to the extent that they serve a prophylactic role, systemati-
cally protecting weaker parties to a relationship when the quality of their
consent is in question.169 In addition, adultery may also be shielded by the
right of relational privacy under certain circumstances. In the absence of
consent by all of the parties involved, however, the right of relational pri-
vacy is lost, both because of the conflict within the adulterous association
and because of the harm inflicted upon any children. 70 But prostitution
166. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (denying constitutional protection to homosexual relationships).
167. See Sandel, supra note 158, at 533-38 (arguing that the dissent in Bowers should have
defended the privacy of homosexual relationships not based upon autonomy, but rather by
articulating the substantive virtues homosexual intimacy shares with heterosexual intimacy).
168. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (denying constitutional protection to polygamous relationships).
169. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 209-10 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (distinguishing homo-
sexual sex from incest on the grounds that "[w]ith respect to incest, a court might well
agree... that the nature of familial relationships renders true consent to incestuous activity suf-
ficiently problematical that a blanket prohibition of such activity is warranted").
170. See id. (distinguishing homosexual sex from adultery on the grounds that "a State might
conclude that adultery is likely to injure third persons, in particular, spouses and children of per-
sons who engage in extramarital affairs").
1106
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remains completely unprotected by the right of relational privacy because
sex is simply exchanged in the course of a commercial transaction, rather
than uniting individuals entwined in an intimate relationship.
IV. CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, AND COMPULSORY
STERILIZATION
This concept of privacy as a relational right is not inconsistent with
the class of cases involving contraception, abortion, and compulsory sterili-
zation. By safeguarding a woman's right to use contraception or have an
abortion over the objections of her husband and her parents, and by guar-
anteeing individuals freedom from forced sterilization, such cases appear to
protect the privacy of the individual rather than relational privacy. Upon
closer consideration, however, these decisions are readily distinguishable
because they actually result from the confluence of relational privacy,
rights of bodily integrity,' and equal protection.1
Although Griswold shielded the privacy of married couples, Eisenstadt
v. Baird subsequently extended constitutional protection to single persons
as well.' In Eisenstadt, the Court determined that a Massachusetts statute
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons was
unconstitutional. While this ruling ostensibly rested upon the Equal Pro-
tection Clause,' 74 it also appears rooted in the constitutional right to
privacy. Conceding that the privacy protected by Griswold "inhered in the
marital relationship," the Court reasoned that "the marital couple is not an
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of
171. See, e.g., Christyne L. Neff, Woman, Womb, and Bodily Integrity, 3 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 327 (1991) (arguing that the right of bodily integrity provides at once a narrower and
stronger protection for abortion rights than the right of privacy).
172. A wide range of scholars now suggest that abortion is more properly framed as an equal
protection right, rather than as a privacy right. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985) (observing
that Roe is "weakened... by the opinion's concentration on a medically approved autonomy
idea, to the exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective"); Catharine
MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 45-54 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) (arguing that abortion
is inextricably intertwined with the issue of gender inequality and "criticiz[ing] the doctrinal
choice to pursue the abortion right under the law of privacy"); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 261 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to
Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1992).
173. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
174. See id. at 454-55 (striking down a Massachusetts statute because it discriminated
against unmarried persons with respect to the distribution of contraceptives, in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause).
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two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup."'
75
Consequently, the Court declared that "[i]f the right of privacy means any-
thing, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."'76 In spite of
its expansive rhetoric, Eisenstadt simply affords unmarried couples the same
freedom of intimate association that Griswold guaranteed to married cou-
ples. In so doing, Eisenstadt is entirely compatible with the concept of
relational privacy.
One year later, in Roe v. Wade, 77 the Court relied upon privacy
grounds to strike down a Texas statute criminalizing abortion. Citing a
long line of past cases, the Court inferred that the right to privacy "has
some extension to activities relating to marriage; procreation; contracep-
tion; family relationships; and child rearing and education.' ',7  The Court
concluded that "[tihis right of privacy. .. is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' 79 Observ-
ing the existence of a conflict between the interests of the woman and the
potential life within her, the Court emphasized that "[t]he pregnant woman
cannot be isolated in her privacy" because "IsIhe carries an embryo and,
later, a fetus."'" Thus, the Court recognized that "[tihe situation.., is
inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of
obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education," for "[the
woman's privacy is no longer sole."' 1 The Court drew the line at viability,
permitting the state to proscribe abortions only after that time88 because
"the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the
mother's womb."'" 3 By defending the abortion right despite this potential
175. Id. at 453.
176. Id.
177. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
178. Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 153.
180. Id. at 159.
181. Id.
182. Roe authorizes states to proscribe abortions after viability in order to further their inter-
est in potential life, unless such abortion restrictions pose a threat to the woman's life or health.
See id. at 163-64.
183. Id. at 163. Perhaps the Court intended to imply that viability defines the point at
which the right of relational privacy is lost because the fetus may be deemed an independent
entity with interests distinct from those of its mother. If so, Roe is arguably consistent with the
right of relational privacy because it protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy only
prior to viability, when she and the fetus may be considered as one.
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conflict between woman and fetus, Roe draws upon women's rights of bod-
ily integrity and principles of equal protection.
The result in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth'" also cannot be
explained solely by reference to the right of relational privacy. In that
case, the Supreme Court considered a provision of a Missouri statute
requiring spousal consent in order to obtain an abortion. The Court
acknowledged the husband's interest "in his wife's pregnancy and in the
growth and development of the fetus she is carrying," but determined that
the state lacked the authority to delegate to a spouse a veto power that the
state never itself possessed.'85 Balancing the conflicting interests of the
parties, the Court implicitly concluded that a woman's rights always out-
weigh those of her husband because of the profound and direct effects of
pregnancy upon her body:
The obvious fact is that when the wife and the husband disagree on
this decision, the view of only one of the two marriage partners can
prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child
and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the preg-
nancy, as between the two, the balance weighs in her favor. 1
6
The Court also struck down another provision of the Missouri statute that
required parental consent for a pregnant minor to obtain an abortion, rely-
ing upon a similar rationale. The Court noted that it is impossible to
maintain the integrity of the family unit when "the minor and the noncon-
senting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the very existence of
the pregnancy has already fractured the family structure."'" 7 Thus the fam-
ily's right to be free from state interference vanishes when parent and child
claim conflicting privacy rights: "Any independent interest the parent may
have in the termination of the minor daughter's pregnancy is no more
weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough
to have become pregnant."' s Danforth held that a woman possesses the
sole right to terminate her pregnancy, over the opposition of her husband
and her parents and in the face of conflict with the interests of the poten-
tial life within her. However, this right flows not simply from relational
privacy, but rather from the woman's own rights to bodily integrity and
equal protection.
184. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
185. Id. at 69.
186. Id. at 71.
187. Id. at 75.
188. id.
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This distinction was made explicit in the Supreme Court's most
recent affirmation of Roe. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,'8 9 the Court
candidly recognized that the abortion right "stands at [the] intersection of
two lines of decisions."'' First, constitutional protection for abortion flows
from the set of cases exemplified by Griswold, which are rooted in the right
of privacy-that is, "the liberty relating to intimate relationships, the fam-
ily, and decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child." 9' But the
Court also emphasized that "Roe... may be seen not only as an exemplar
of Griswold liberty but as a rule... of personal autonomy and bodily integ-
rity, with doctrinal affinity to [a second line ofi cases recognizing limits on
governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejec-
tion. "'9 In addition, a majority of the Court acknowledged, for the first
time,' 9' that the right to an abortion rests upon equal protection "because
the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condi-
tion and so unique to the law."' 9' Observing that "[tihe mother who carries
a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain
that only she must bear," the Court concluded:
That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race
been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes
of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be
grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is
too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon
its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision
has been in the course of our history and culture.'
95
Casey makes clear that the abortion right does not depend solely upon the
right to privacy. When the family is fragmented and a pregnant woman
and her husband or parents disagree, their privacy disappears and they pos-
sess no right to be free from state interference in their intimate relation-
ship. Nevertheless, the woman alone retains the right to terminate her
pregnancy because of the profound impact of pregnancy upon her body and
because a contrary result might undercut the "ability of women to partici-
pate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation."' 96 The woman
189. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
190. Id. at 857.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. The majority consists of the three Justices who authored the joint opinion, Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, as well as Justices Blackmun and Stevens.
194. Id. at 852.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 856.
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alone retains the right to an abortion even though this may conflict with
the interests of the potential life within her, the wishes of her husband, and
the command of her parents. Protection of a woman's decision making is
required not by constitutional privacy, but because any other result would
invade a woman's bodily integrity and violate her equal protection rights.
In addition to protecting contraception and abortion, the Constitu-
tion also prevents compulsory sterilization, 97 at least when it is conducted
in a discriminatory fashion. In Skinner v. Okahoma,'98 for example, the
Court struck down Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which
authorized the sterilization of persons thrice convicted of a felony involv-
ing moral turpitude. Because the statute permitted the sterilization of
chicken thieves but not embezzlers, the Court ruled that it contravened the
Equal Protection Clause: "When the law lays an unequal hand on those
who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes
one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had
selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment."' 99 Con-
sequently, "strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a
sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious dis-
criminations are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of
the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws."2°° By declaring that
"[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race,"' '2 however, the Court implied that its holding rested
upon privacy as well as equal protection principles. But laws authorizing
the sterilization of certain categories of persons are unconstitutional not
simply because they invade the integrity of intimate relationships. Rather,
such laws are unconstitutional because they violate the individual's right of
bodily autonomy and endanger the equal protection rights of minorities by
raising the threat of eugenics.
197. But see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding a Virginia law authorizing sterili-
zation of "mental defectives" in state institutions). In his infamous opinion in Buck, Justice
Holmes wrote:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are
manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory
vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.... Three generations
of imbeciles are enough.
Id. at 207.
198. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
199. Id. at 541 ("The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, farreaching and devas-
tating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the
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Accordingly, the right of privacy, although occasionally associated
with cases involving intrusions upon the body,0 2 must be distinguished
from bodily autonomy, an ancient right that predates privacy03 and is
embodied in such common law principles as the tort of battery and the
doctrine of informed consent. The right of bodily integrity protects a
woman's sole right to bar the fetus from entering her body by means of con-
traception and to rid her body of the fetus by means of abortion. It also
encompasses the right to resist compulsory sterilization. Bodily integrity
does not, however, guarantee infertile persons the right to conceive with
the assistance of reproductive technologies and reproductive collaborators
because such procedures do not prevent any invasion of the body.2°4 To the
202. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1990) ("Although
many state courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized
constitutional right of privacy, we have never so held. We believe this issue is more properly
analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.").
203. This right to be free from physical invasions of the body possesses an ancient pedigree.
See id. at 278 (declaring that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior
decisions"); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (declaring that prisoners possess a
"significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs");
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 764 (1985) (stating that the forcible removal of a bullet from an
accused person's body "would be an 'extensive' intrusion on [his] personal privacy and bodily
integrity"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that forced stomach-
pumping of the accused to extract evidence "shocks the conscience" in violation of the Due
Process Clause); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (balancing an individual's
liberty interest in resisting immunization against the state's interest in preventing disease);
Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (stating, "No right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless
by clear and unquestionable authority of law").
204. Cf. Susan M. Wolf, Physician-Assisted Suicide, Abortion, and Treatment Refusal: Using
Gender to Analyze the Difference, in PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 167, 170 (Robert F. Weir ed.,
1997). Professor Wolf argues that constitutional protection should be afforded to abortion and
to the refusal of life-sustaining medical care, but not to physician-assisted suicide, because the
latter does not implicate the right of bodily integrity. Declaring that Casey "recognizes a right to
be free of [the] invasion [of] unwanted pregnancy," Wolf distinguishes physician-assisted suicide
on the grounds that the Constitution "clearly embraces the right to be free of unwanted bodily
invasion. But it is not at all clear that it covers a right to be free to obtain bodily invasions for
the purpose of ending your own life." Id. at 173. Wolf continues:
Certainly both abortion and treatment refusal can require a second bodily invasion-
the doctor may have to enter the body to remove the fetus or the feeding tube.... Yet
the fact that abortion and treatment refusal may require invasion does not alter the
point of all this activity-removal of something from the body. This is not the case in
assisted suicide. No primary invasion is being removed when the physician supplies the
means of bodily invasion for suicide.
Id. The same arguments hold true for assisted reproduction, a process that also does not involve
the removal of anything from the body. On the contrary, techniques such as in vitro fertilization
often entail affirmative invasions of the body in order to initiate conception, pregnancy, and
childbirth.
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contrary, assisted reproduction may actually require affirmative invasions
into the body of some participants in the process in order to initiate con-
ception, pregnancy, and childbirth.
Nor does equal protection require a constitutional right to assisted
reproduction. Indeed, many feminist critics persuasively contend that
these new modes of reproduction actually create inequality by reinforcing a
woman's primary role as that of child bearer, reducing women to their
wombs and perpetuating patriarchy.0 5 Other scholars argue that reproduc-
tive technologies also endanger equality by reflecting and reinforcing
racial2°  and other hierarchies.0 7
V. PRIVACY AND PROCREATION
In a slightly different context, Washington v. Glucksberg0s teaches the
lesson that the Constitution contains no expansive and all-encompassing
right to die. On the contrary, its promise of bodily integrity protects only a
limited right to disconnect the body from the invasive medical apparatus
keeping it alive.'0 9 Similarly, the preceding sections of this Article suggest
that there is no general constitutional right to marry, to form a family, to
205. See, e.g., JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS (1993) (arguing that technological
and contractual reproduction result in the reproductive exploitation of women and undermine
women's right to equality); REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
(Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995); BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD:
IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY (1989); SUSAN SHERWIN, NO
LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE (1992). But see CARMEL SHALEV,
BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 12 (1989) (arguing that it is consistent with
feminism for women to be able to use their reproductive capacity to earn money and power);
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for
Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 303 (arguing that rules which look to individual
intentions to determine the legal parents of children born of assisted reproduction enhance
gender equality).
206. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935
(1996); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209 (1995); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
207. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The In/Fertile, the Too Fertile, and the Dysfertile, 47 HASTINGS L.J.
1007 (1996) (exploring ways in which infertility discourse constructs boundaries that divide
women into different categories and oppress women of color, poor women, and lesbians in differ-
ent ways).
208. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (upholding a Washington law prohibiting physician-assisted
suicide).
209. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990)
(acknowledging that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions,"
and suggesting that this principle encompasses the right to refuse life-saving hydration and
nutrition).
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procreate or not to procreate, to rear children, and to engage in sexual
activity. Instead, the right to privacy secures the freedom to conduct inti-
mate and consensual associations,1 while the rights of bodily integrity and
equal protection work together to afford constitutional protection to par-
ticular acts involved in procreation."'
Hence, it is a mistake to equate privacy with a general constitutional
right to engage in any or all of these activities free from governmental• ¢ 212
interference. Rather than granting an individual entitlement to engage
in important activities, the right to privacy creates a zone of immunity
around intimate relationships. Privacy does not furnish a sweeping right of
reproductive freedom that can be transported from one setting to
another." Instead, the rights of privacy, bodily integrity, and equal pro-
tection, acting together, 14 protect the choice not to reproduce under
certain circumstances, providing a right to prevent intrusions into the body
by means of contraception and a right to free the body of intruders by
means of abortion. If, however, it ultimately becomes possible to expel the
fetus intact from a woman's body, without injuring it in the process,
nothing in the case law suggests that there also exists a right to destroy the
fetus, at least so long as the new procedure poses no threat to the life or
health of the mother!1
210. See discussion supra Part 111.
211. See discussion supra Part IV.
212. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 206 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (declar-
ing that "the right to privacy is more than the mere aggregation of a number of entitlements to
engage in specific behavior"); cf. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 784 (arguing that the right to
privacy consists not of the freedom to perform certain fundamental acts, but rather of the
"freedom not to have one's life too totally determined by... [the] state").
213. See Tushnet, supra note 46, at 1364-69 (arguing that rights do not exist in the abstract
but instead depend upon their context, so that "relatively small changes in technology would
make it impossible-or at least very difficult-to talk about a right to an abortion").
214. Cf. David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753
(1994) (arguing for a transactional approach to constitutional adjudication that would require
courts to aggregate constitutional rights, rather than to measure liberty in a fractured and myopic
way through the constricting lenses of individual amendments).
215. Under current constitutional doctrine, state attempts to preserve the life of the fetus are
constitutional so long as they do not pose any additional risks to the woman's health. See
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 485 n.8 (1983) (upholding a second-physician
requirement during postviability abortions to provide additional protection for the life of the
fetus); see also Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
768-69 (1986) (striking down a requirement that physicians use abortion techniques with the
best chance for the fetus to be aborted alive because the requirement balanced the woman's
health against the fetus's life), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
In the words of Professor Laurence Tribe:
[Tihe liberty that is most plainly vindicated by the right to end one's pregnancy is the
woman's liberty not to be made unwillingly into a mother, the freedom to say no to the
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Likewise, there exists no corresponding right to reproduce that can be
transplanted to a radically different context. The right to bodily integrity
prohibits physical invasions of the body, protecting "the right to refuse
abortion and carry a coital pregnancy to term, as well as the right to resist
compulsory contraception or sterilization," but it does not necessarily
"extend[ constitutional protection to noncoital methods of reproduc-
tion.""6 And relational privacy encompasses the right of consenting adults
entwined in an intimate relationship to engage in discrete acts involved in
procreation. Specifically, it allows parties who are entirely in agreement to
conceive by means of sexual intercourse or with the assistance of tech-
nology, to carry the pregnancy to term, and to rear the resulting child, all
free from governmental interference. Relational privacy does not, how-
ever, protect commercial transactions between complete strangers, nor
does it include a right to any form of state assistance or involvement in
procreation.
217
But because it is a relational right, privacy is bounded by the counter-
vailing interests of others within the protected association. Accordingly,
the right of relational privacy ends at the point when individuals within
a protected relationship assert contradictory interests. Thus, relational pri-
vacy does not require the state to advance the right to procreate for some
participants if that would entail denying the right not to procreate for1 218
other participants to the venture. Similarly, the state need not vindicate
unique sacrifice inherent in the processes of pregnancy and childbirth. A 'right' not to
have a biological child in existence-the right during pregnancy, for example, to destroy
one's fetus rather than simply being unburdened of it-is analytically distinct, and seems
harder to support .... While there may be arguments in favor of recognizing a woman's
right, early in pregnancy, to destroy the fetus growing within her for the very purpose of
preventing a living child of hers from coming into being, this is not the liberty the
Court undertook to protect in Roe.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 98-99 (1992); see also Tushnet,
supra note 46, at 1366-69 (arguing that changes in technology would radically alter the right to
an abortion).
216. Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1473, 1485 (1995).
217. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (holding that the constitutional right to
an abortion does not impose an affirmative obligation on the government to provide the finan-
cial resources necessary to exercise the right by subsidizing abortions, because "although govern-
ment may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need
not remove those not of its own creation"); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977)
(holding that the constitutional right to an abortion is only a negative "right protectling] the
woman from... interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It
implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth
over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds").
218. See Witbeck-Wildhagen v. Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122 (111. App. Ct. 1996) (deter.
mining that privacy does not encompass the right to require the husband of a woman who
engaged in artificial insemination with donor sperm without his knowledge or consent to serve as
1115
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one individual's right to procreate when doing so would violate another's
right to bodily integrity."9 In addition, the state is not obligated to protect
the parental rights of some progenitors at the expense of extinguishing the
parental rights of others,20 nor is it required to enforce parenting agree-
ments to rear exclusively the resulting child over the objections of other
parties to the contract. 22' All of these are not part of the right of relational
privacy. In these contexts, disputes divide the parties to the relationship.
And when the association loses the capacity for decentralized decision
making, it forfeits the relational privacy that provided constitutional pro-
tection to its intimate activities.
If the relationships between people with respect to an activity are
entirely consensual, privacy may protect them all against interference by
the state. But when there is dissent among the individuals involved in a
relationship, individual assertions of a right to privacy become incoherent
and the state is entitled to-indeed, may be obligated to-intrude in order
to adjust the relative rights and relationships of the parties. Properly
understood as a relational right, the right to privacy breaks down when it is
applied to situations involving conflicts within the association. The right
to privacy has no place in such situations, and decisions must be based on
policy and not on constitutional privacy grounds.
VI. RELATIONAL PRIVACY AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
Application of the principle of relational privacy to the problems
posed by assisted reproduction yields the following conclusions. At a
minimum, relational privacy encompasses the right of a couple bound
together in marriage or a similarly intimate union to combine their own
gametes with the assistance of various reproductive technologies, such as
artificial insemination, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, and in vitro fer-
the child's legal father if the requirement would interfere with the husband's own right not to
procreate); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that privacy does not
include the right to obtain and implant embryos over the objections of the other gamete-
provider asserting a right not to procreate). But see Kass v. Kass, No. 93-19658, 1995 WL
110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (finding that the right not to procreate is waived after
initial participation in IVF, so that a husband has no right to prevent his ex-wife from gestating
unused embryos), rev'd, 663 N.Y.S.2d 58 (App. Div. 1997).
219. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (striking down laws requiring
spousal consent in order to terminate pregnancy by means of an abortion); In re Baby M., 525
A.2d 1128, 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (stating in dicta that enforcement of a pro-
vision in a surrogacy contract prohibiting a surrogate from aborting would be unconstitutional).
220. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986); Thomas S. v. Robin Y.,
618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (App. Div. 1994).
221. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1243 (N.J. 1988).
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tilization. That reproduction occurs in the presence of a physician does not
deprive such couples of constitutional protection, for the privacy right
attaches to their act of intimate association.2 22 Moreover, the state lacks
the power to intervene in this process because no other individual possesses
a constitutional interest in preventing the couple's attempt to form a fam-
ily223 simply because conception takes place in a laboratory. 24
There is, however, no constitutional right to buy or sell sperm, eggs,
embryos, or gestational services, even when necessary for procreation
within the context of an intimate association. Such commercial transac-
tions are not part of the right of relational privacy. Gamete providers and
surrogate gestators are not engaged in any act of affiliation; instead, they
simply seek to trade goods and services. And although a couple attempting
to form a family with the assistance of reproductive collaborators possesses
a stronger claim, the purchase of gametes and gestational capacity does not
fall within their freedom of intimate association. By introducing strangers
into the relationship, the couple is at once diminishing the privacy of their
association and simultaneously enhancing the state's interest in protecting
these other individuals, who become potential parties to the relationship
and whose own interests may diverge from those of the couple. Hence, the
state possesses the power to outlaw markets in human gametes and gesta-
tional services. By this reasoning, laws preventing the purchase or sale of
222. This point was made explicit in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), which
declared:
IT]he constitutionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation,
and child rearing is not just concerned with a particular place, but with a protected
intimate relationship. Such protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hos-
pital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy
involved.
Id. at 66 n. 13.
223. The right of relational privacy shields the family from intervention by outsiders. This
was the result reached in one well-publicized case, where the court definitively rejected the peti-
tions of two strangers who sought appointment as legal guardians of a comatose pregnant woman
and her 17-week-old fetus, respectively, in order to prevent her family's decision to allow an
abortion, stating: "[TIhe record confirms that these absolute strangers to the Klein family, what-
ever their motivation, have no place in the midst of this family tragedy." In re Klein, 145 A.D.2d
145, 148-49 (NY App. Div. 1989) (per curiam) (upholding trial court's appointment of husband
to serve as temporary guardian of his comatose pregnant wife for the purpose of authorizing phy-
sicians to interrupt her pregnancy and perform any other medical procedures necessary to pre-
serve her life, when there was no showing of a conflict between the interests of husband and wife
and the husband's petition was supported by the woman's parents).
224. Of course, the state still possesses the power to prohibit use of particular methods of
assisted conception if they pose a threat to the resulting children, in order to protect these vul-
nerable parties to the relationship. Cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (allowing
the state to intervene in an intact family if there is clear and convincing evidence of parental
neglect or abuse of the children).
HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1117 1997-1998
human eggs and embryos,225 or prohibiting commercial surrogacy con-226
tracts, are entirely constitutional. In addition, although relational pri-
vacy embraces the right to select one's mate without regard to race,"' it
does not create a corresponding right to select donor sperm, eggs, or
embryos for genetic reasons. The former falls within the act of construct-
ing an intimate community, while the latter simply constitutes an arms-
length commercial transaction. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the
Court drew an analogous distinction when it declared that "the Consti-
tution undoubtedly imposes constraints on the State's power to control the
selection of one's spouse that would not apply to regulations affecting the
choice of one's fellow employees.228 Thus, the Court affirmed the consti-
tutional right to discriminate based upon race with respect to one's partner
in marriage, but it refused to afford the same protection to the Jaycees'
decision to exclude women from their professional organization.
Once a couple unites their own gametes with the assistance of repro-
ductive technology, the right of relational privacy also extends to their
joint decisions regarding the disposition of any resulting embryos. The
couple may choose to implant the embryos and carry them to term or to
preserve cryogenically the embryos for future use. Indeed, even a decision
to discard extracorporeal embryos, though distinguishable from the act of
abortion because it implicates no right of bodily integrity, might well be
included within the couple's right of relational privacy on the grounds that
225. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (West 1996) (declaring that "[no person shall
knowingly advertise or offer to purchase or sell, or purchase, sell, or otherwise transfer, any
human embryo for valuable consideration" and criminalizing a violation of this section as "a
felony of the second degree"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 1997) ("The sale of a human
ovum, fertilized human ovum, or human embryo is expressly prohibited."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
54-1(0 (1996) (stating that "[n]o person shall knowingly sell, transfer, distribute, or give away
any fetus for a use which is in violation of the provisions of this section"-namely,
experimentation-and specifying that "the word 'fetus' shall include an embryo").
226. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (Michie 1995) (proscribing surrogacy
contracts for compensation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West 1997) (rendering paid surro-
gacy contracts null, void, and unenforceable); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859 (West 1993)
(prohibiting commercial surrogacy contracts and prescribing criminal fines and/or imprisonment
for participation in or procurement of such agreements); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1995)
(declaring surrogacy contracts for compensation to be unenforceable); N.Y. DOM. REL. § 123
(McKinney Supp. 1997-1998) (forbidding commercial surrogacy and imposing civil and/or
criminal penalties for violations); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(1) (1995) (prohibiting surro-
gacy contracts for profit and providing that violations constitute a misdemeanor); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.26.230 (West 1997) (barring surrogacy contracts for compensation).
227. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down a statute prohibiting inter-
racial marriage).
228. 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
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it involves their formation of a family.2 9 As the Tennessee Supreme Court
declared in Davis v. Davis, "the state's interest in potential human life is
insufficient to justify an infringement on the gamete-provider's pro-
creational autonomy... [because] no other person or entity has an interest
sufficient to permit interference with the gamete-providers' decision to
continue or terminate the IVF process."' " Accordingly, laws prohibit-
ing the destruction of extra embryos23' or requiring unused embryos to be
made available to others for "adoptive implantation" '232 are most likely
unconstitutional.
If the couple disagrees as to the disposition of their embryos, however,
they forfeit their right of relational privacy. Once the integrity of their
relationship has been impaired, the state is entitled to intervene in order to
preserve the interests of the individuals involved. The state may elect to
protect the party seeking to procreate because it wishes to favor potential
life,2" ' or it may adopt some other resolution to such controversies. In any
event, so long as the state is acting in the interests of one or more of the
individuals included within the relationship,1 4 the intricate balance
between their competing interests should be left to policy, rather than con-
229. The parents' decision to discard an embryo is encompassed within their right of rela-
tional privacy unless the, embryo is itself deemed a party to the relationship. Roe authorizes states
to proscribe abortions after viability on the grounds that "the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb," implying that the fetus becomes an
independent entity whose own interests may be protected at the point of viability. See Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). But if viability turns on the fetus's ability to survive outside
of its mother, rather than on the stage of biological development, then even extracorporeal
embryos could be considered "viable" from the very moment of conception. This interpretation
follows because early embryos can always be implanted in another woman's uterus and brought to
term, without any assistance from their biological mother. See Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status
of the Proposition That "Life Begins at Conception," 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 620-21 (1991).
Accordingly, state regulations in the interests of such embryos would not contravene the right of
relational privacy whenever the embryos' interests conflict with those of the progenitors. On the
contrary, embryo protection statutes would be constitutional so long as they do not impair other
constitutional rights, such as the woman's rights of bodily integrity and equal protection.
230. 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992).
231. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 1997) (providing that "[a] viable in vitro
fertilized human ovum is a juridical person which shall not be intentionally destroyed by any
natural or other juridical person or through the actions of any other such person").
232. See, e.g., id. § 9:130 (requiring that "[i]f the in vitro fertilization patients
renounce.., their parental rights for in utero implantation, then the in vitro fertilized human
ovum shall be available for adoptive implantation").
233. See Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47 HASTINGS
L.J. 1063, 1067 (1996) (arguing that courts should value the life of the embryo or fetus when this
approach does not conflict with a woman's liberty interest in not being pregnant).
234. For example, if one party wishes to implant the embryos and carry them to term alone
and the other party wishes to destroy them, the state cannot simply disregard both parties'
avowed wishes and donate the embryos to yet another couple for adoptive implantation.
HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1119 1997-1998
trolled by constitutional law. Such a result follows because "[t]he new
reproductive technologies... raise issues too complex to be decided
according to constitutional principles that permanently balance basic val-
ues, setting them in constitutional stone."" 5 Instead, states must possess
the latitude to make trade offs between a multitude of conflicting interests
and achieve rough accommodations that may differ depending upon the
context and consequences.
Once a couple is able to obtain access to donated gametes and con-
ceive a child by means of assisted reproduction, however, the complexity of
the situation increases dramatically. Consider the case of artificial insemi-
nation with donor sperm."' Although a woman has no constitutional right
to acquire semen from an anonymous donor, if the state allows her to do
so,237 then she will most likely escape interference in her relationship with
the resulting child. The donor's very anonymity will probably preclude any
attempts to enter the relationship, and absent a conflict among the parties
to the protected relationship, they are all shielded from state intrusion
under the umbrella of privacy.
But when a woman conceives by means of artificial insemination with
semen supplied by a known donor, she risks including the donor within the
relationship that is protected by the right to privacy. If the donor elects to
come forward and makes significant efforts to participate in the parenting
process, then he may be considered a member of the child's family. In that
case, the right of relational privacy would not immunize the child's mother
against state interference designed to protect the biological father's interest
in his own child. The state may choose to preserve the biological father's
relationship with his child, or it may favor maintaining the integrity of the
woman's family. Neither result is compelled by constitutional principles
under the rubric of relational privacy. And both comport with cases such
as Jhordan C., which rejected the woman's claim that privacy insulated her
from state interference when she conceived a child with the sperm of a
235. Rao, supra note 216, at 1495-96.
236. The same reasoning may be applied, with minor modifications, to situations involving
donor eggs or embryos.
237. At least 35 states currently possess statutes allowing artificial insemination with donor
sperm. Thirteen of these statutes are modeled on the Uniform Parentage Act, an advisory statute
developed in 1973 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
states that have modeled their legislation on the UPA are: Alabama, California, Colorado,
Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See generally Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and Binding
Biology: Seeking AID in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524, 534-38 (1994).
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donor who was not excluded from her family "either by anonymity, by
agreement, or by the parties' conduct."'  Both outcomes are also consis-
tent with the result (if not the reasoning) of Michael H., which affords
states the opportunity to adopt a wide variety of approaches to address
disagreements that develop between the parties involved in an intimate
relationship." 9
Likewise, even if a state fails to prohibit the purchase or sale of repro-
ductive resources such as sperm, eggs, embryos, or gestational capacity,
relational privacy does not embrace the right to enforce contracts
purporting to transfer parental rights to the resulting child. A surrogacy
contract, for example, by its very nature involves a close connection
between the surrogate mother and child, who are necessarily entwined in
an intimate and extensive relationship during the entire nine-month
period of gestation. When the surrogate's interests conflict with those of
the contract parents, therefore, the right of relational privacy vanishes and
the state is entitled to regulate in the interests of the parties to the rela-
tionship. The state may refuse to enforce such contracts and protect the
surrogate's relationship with her biological child, as it did in Baby M., ° or
it may award the child to the contract parents and preserve the integrity
of the marital family, as occurred in Johnson v. Calvert. 4 ' As long as there
is no conflict with other constitutional rights, these solutions and many
others are available to the state. Under the right of relational privacy,
there is no single necessarily correct constitutional resolution to these
controversies. To the contrary, within very broad constitutional para-
meters, states possess the latitude to deal with these problems in many
different ways, all of which are equally constitutional.
CONCLUSION
A fundamental problem pervades the constitutional cases regarding
assisted reproduction: It is the awkwardness and inadequacy of the language
238. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 536 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d
356 (App. Div. 1994).
239. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (denying a biological father parental rights when opposed by the
biological mother and her husband).
240. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1234-35 (N.J. 1988) (refusing to enforce a surrogacy
contract but awarding custody to contract parents based upon the child's best interests, while
affording surrogate visitation rights with the biological child).
241. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (rejecting a gestational surrogate's claim that she be recog-
nized as the child's legal mother and awarding custody to child's genetic parents).
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of liberal individual rights as applied to multiparty disputes. 4 "Con-
stitutional law's strength lies in addressing disputes that pit the individual
against the state. Cases that present a multiplicity of conflicting rights and
a plethora of adverse parties, however, are less readily resolved by resort to
global constitutional principles." 4' When each party to a conflict possesses
his or her own personal right of privacy, no one necessarily receives
constitutional protection. This scenario leads in turn to a situation of
constitutional indeterminacy, granting courts almost unlimited power to
strike whatever balance they please under the rubric of constitutional
law. Once the balance is struck, moreover, rigid constitutional rules may
freeze further development in an area where the facts are still in flux
and where the values are as yet uncertain, manifesting no clear social
244consensus.
These problems point to an even deeper deficiency in the prevailing
conception of constitutional privacy. The right of privacy currently
reflects the liberal paradigm, sheltering isolated individuals from the over-
whelming power of government. This conception of privacy works well
when its liberal assumptions hold true-that is, when individuals are
united against the state. Yet the liberal conception of privacy appears
inadequate when the state is simply mediating conflicts among those whose
lives are intimately intertwined, intervening to protect some individuals
from others in a relationship. Such situations call for a republican para-
digm--one that envisions individuals as interconnected and that trusts
government when it is acting to promote the welfare of all members of an
association. 45
242. Professor Carl Schneider points to a similar problem in the context of family law-
[Wihen we in America think about rights, we tend to think in terms of the 'Mill para-
digm.' That is, we think in terms of the state's regulation of a person's actions. In such
conflicts, we are predisposed to favor the person, out of respect for his moral autonomy
and human dignity.... In family law, however, the Mill paradigm often breaks down,
because in family law conflicts are often not between a person and the state but
between one person and another person.... Our legal thinking about rights has con-
spicuously, if understandably, failed to develop a satisfactory alternative to the Mill
paradigm with which to approach such conflicts.
Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L. REV. 151, 157 (1988).
243. See Rao, supra note 216, at 1495.
244. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 361, 362-63
(1996) (urging courts to employ constitutional caution in the area of cyberspace, where under-
lying facts are as yet unknown and rapidly changing and underlying values are still in flux).
245. Of course, the republican conception of privacy is no more capable of yielding easy
answers than its liberal counterpart. Difficult questions remain regarding the degree of intimacy
necessary for a relationship to receive constitutional protection and the extent of fragmentation
within a relationship required to trigger the loss of such protection. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 241-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (observing the existence of a potential
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By reconceiving privacy as a relational right that attaches to entire
associations rather than to isolated individuals, both the liberal and repub-
lican dimensions of this constitutional right are openly acknowledged and
integrated. As a relational right, privacy is bounded by the countervailing
interests of others: It ends at the point when individuals within a protected
relationship assert contradictory interests. Accordingly, when individuals
are aligned against the state, the right of relational privacy shelters them
all in their associations with one another, consistent with the liberal
vision. But, if the individuals involved in reproduction are at odds, then
the right of relational privacy fails to insulate them, either from the state or
from the claims of one another. Indeed, once discord divides those
entwined in an intimate relationship, the state is entitled to intervene
in order to protect the interests of the parties involved. In such areas
of constitutional indeterminacy-of tragic choices between competing
interests-there is no single necessarily correct constitutional resolution to
a controversy. Instead, consistent with the republican vision, the state is
entrusted to balance the multitude of conflicting individual interests based
upon policy rather than by resort to constitutional principles. The right of
relational privacy thereby affords states the latitude to address the complex
problems posed by assisted reproduction in a wide variety of ways, all of
which are entirely constitutional.
conflict between the Amish parents' right to inculcate their religion and the interests of their
children in obtaining a high school education and suggesting that such fragmentation within the
family may result in forfeiture of parental rights). Nevertheless, the republican approach focuses
attention upon issues ignored under prevailing analysis. Rather than addressing intrafamily
conflicts by balancing competing individual rights, the republican conception of privacy exam-
ines the nature and extent of associational relationships.
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